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THE CHALLENGES OF AMERICAN IMPERIAL POWER
Michael Ignatieff
We live in a world that has no precedents since the age of the later Romanemperors. What is so remarkable is not simply the military domination
of the world by a single power. In Alfred Thayer Mahan’s time, Britain domi-
nated the seas (but had to share its domination with a number of other navies).
It is not just the fact that this single power, the United States, has achieved its
dominance at incredibly low cost to its economy—some 3.5 percent of gross do-
mestic product. It is not simply the awesome reach of its military capability—
the ability of an air command center in Saudi Arabia to deliver B-52 strikes on a
mountaintop in Afghanistan within seventeen minutes of receiving target
coordinates from special forces on the ground. Nor is
it resolve; terrorists everywhere have been cured of the
illusion created by the American debacle in Somalia in
1993 that America lacks the stomach for a fight. What
is remarkable is the combination of all these: techno-
logical dominance at a lower cost proportional to
wealth than at any other time in history, absence of
peer competitors, and inflexible resolve to defend its
way of life—and those of other nations as well, who,
like Canada (I happen to be a Canadian citizen), are
happy to shelter under American imperial protection.
Parallels to the Roman Empire become evident.
The difference, however, is that the Romans were un-
troubled by having an empire or by the idea of an im-
perial destiny, while the Americans, who have had an
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empire, it could be argued, since Theodore Roosevelt, persist in believing that
they do not. The United States, then, is a unique empire—an imperial power
without consciousness of itself as such. On 11 November 2002, President George
W. Bush, remembering Americans in uniform who had laid down their lives, re-
marked in passing that America is not an empire—it has no imperial designs, no
intention of conquest.* There is no reason not to take the president at his word; I
am speaking of empire in a different way. Empires need not have colonies, need
not be established by conquest and aggression; the United States is an empire in
the sense that it structures the global order. It does so primarily with American
military power, diplomatic resources, and economic assets, and it does so pri-
marily in the service of its own national interests. If its interests can serve those
of allies as well, so be it, but the United States acts on that basis even if they do
not. It is impossible to understand the global order, or the sense in which it is an
order at all, without understanding the permanently structuring role of Ameri-
can global power projection.
The well-known maps indicating the division of the globe into the “areas of
responsibility” of CentCom, NorthCom, and all the other “Coms”† convey an
idea of the architecture underlying the entire global order. This is a different vi-
sion of global order than Europe’s—that of a multilateral world ordered by in-
ternational law. There is a great deal about international law that can be
admired, but it seems to miss the fundamental point—the extent to which
global order is sustained by American power. In November 2002, for instance,
the United Nations Security Council passed, fifteen votes to none, a resolution
on Iraq. We can be perfectly sure, however, that without the inflexible, unrelent-
ing American pursuit, through those multilateral institutions, of the U.S. na-
tional interest, nothing would have happened in respect to Saddam Hussein’s
weapons of mass destruction. Multilateral institutions like the United Nations
are important, but their entire momentum, force, and direction are driven by
American power; literally nothing happens in these institutions unless the
Americans put their shoulders to the wheel. It is in that sense that I refer to
America’s exercise of an imperial structuring and ordering role in the world, and
in that sense that there is an analogy to Rome.
But there is a more troubling parallel—troubling for those who use military
power for a living—with the Roman Empire in its later centuries. It is that
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* “Over the generations, Americans have defended this nation without seeking to dominate any na-
tion. American troops do not come as conquerors, but as liberators.” “President Commemorates
Veterans Day at Arlington Nat[iona]l Cemetery,” The White House, www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/11/20021111-3.htm [22 November 2002].
† The nine unified combatant commands—including U.S. Central Command and U.S. Northern
Command. See “Unified Combatant Commands,” Defense Almanac, www.defenselink.mil/pubs/
almanac/almanac/organization/Combatant_Commands.
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overwhelming military superiority does not translate into security. Mastery of
the known world does not confer peace of mind. America has now felt the dread
that the ancient world must have known when Rome itself was first threatened
by the Goths. In the fifth century, an imperial people awakened fully to the men-
ace of the barbarians on the frontier when they poured over the marches and
sacked the city; today the menace lies just beyond the zone of stable democratic
states that see the Pentagon, and until 2001 the World Trade Center, as head-
quarters. In those border zones, modern-day barbarians can use technology to
collapse distance, to inflict devastating damage on centers of power far away. In
March 2001, I asked an audience of U.S. Naval Academy midshipmen from
which country the next threat to their ships would come; they could not answer
the question. I suggested Afghanistan, to stunned silence. Even to these educated
young men and women, only five months after the attack on the USS Cole, the
strategic challenge that a tiny country on India’s northwest frontier could pose
to the United States was not evident.
We have now awakened to the barbarians. We have awakened to the radical
collapse and distance that they have wrought. Retribution has been visited on
the barbarians, and more will follow, but the U.S. military knows that it has be-
gun a campaign without an obvious end, and that knowledge has already af-
fected the American way of life and the way Americans think about it. The most
carefree empire in history now confronts the question of whether it can escape
Rome’s ultimate fate. The challenge can be localized, for a moment in Afghani-
stan, then in Iraq, but it is global in character, and that is unsettling. There are
pacification operations, overt or covert, already under way in Yemen, in Somalia,
in the Sudan. According to the Washington Post, al-Qa‘ida attempts to launder
financial assets have been traced to Lebanese business circles that control the ex-
port of diamonds from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, and the Congo. There are
cells to be rooted out in the Philippines and in Indonesia. Now, at this writing,
there is the prospect of an operation against Iraq, of which the primary purpose,
self-evidently, is the elimination not only of weapons of mass destruction but of
the core of Arab rejectionism. Its aim is to break the logjam that has frustrated
Middle East peace for fifty-odd years and then to reorder the map of an entire
area to serve the strategic interests of the United States. If that is not an imperial
project, what is?
An American empire that had since the defeat in Vietnam been cautious in its
designs has been roused to go on the offensive. The awakening was brutal, but
there might be reason, in an ironic way, to be thankful—as a great poet once said,
barbarians are a “kind of solution.”* Barbarism is not new; fanaticism is not
I G N A T I E F F 5 5
* Constantine Cavafy (Konstantinos Kavafis, 1863–1933), in Awaiting the Barbarians: “Now what’s
going to happen to us without barbarians? / Those people were a kind of solution.”
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new. What is new is the connection between barbarian asymmetric methods and
a global ideology, Islam, that provides a bottomless supply of recruits and allies
for a global war. Also new is the way in which fanatics have exploited the values
of our society—our openness and freedom, as well as our technology—to take
war to the heart of the empire.
The single most dangerous thing about terrorism is the claim that terrorists
are responding to grievances about which, in fact, they do not care. The 11 Sep-
tember attackers made no demands at all, declared no explicit political agenda.
They went to their deaths in complete silence. Nonetheless, hundreds of mil-
lions of people accepted them as representatives of their own long-frustrated
political desires—to drive Israel into the sea, to expel America from the holy
places, and so on. The hijackers themselves were more interested in the spectacle
of destruction, in violence for its own sake, than in the redemption of the down-
trodden, but they have been taken as martyrs for political ends.
Unless some of those political ends can be addressed, it is not clear that there
can be an appropriate solution to the problem of terrorism; the U.S. armed
forces are being asked to solve militarily a problem that probably, in the end, has
only political solutions. Robust military responses are needed, but they must be
part of a political strategy—in
fact, a geopolitical strategy, one
that recognizes that the American
homeland has found itself caught
in the crossfire of a civil war. The
terrorists are not attacking only
the United States, or even the West; they are also coming after its Arab allies.
They want nothing more than to return the Arab world to A.D. 640, to the time of
the Prophet. The civil war is a desperate struggle between the politics of pure re-
action, represented by client Arab regimes, and the politics of the impossible—
the desire to take these societies out of modernity altogether. That viewpoint
brings home how exposed politically the United States is. One aspect of that vul-
nerability that the attacks of 11 September 2001 laid bare is the extent to which
the West has treated its Arab allies as mere gas stations. These Arab states have
become decayed and incompetent betrayers of their own people, and betraying
and incompetent defenders of U.S. interests. The American empire is in the pro-
cess of discovering that in the Middle East the pillars upon which it depends for
support are built of sand; that is one element of the political challenge it faces.
Another element, and one of the unacknowledged causes of “9/11,” is the jux-
taposition of globalized prosperity in the “American world” with the disintegra-
tion of states and state order in places that achieved independence from the
colonial empires after the Second World War. American hegemony in the post–
5 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Cold War world has coincided with a process of state disintegration. The United
States has achieved global hegemony just as the global order is beginning to
come apart at the seams. Not only are the colonial states that arose between 1947
and 1960 in Africa and Asia starting to unravel (Exhibit A being Pakistan), but
the states, like Georgia, that achieved independence with the end of the Soviet
empire are also beginning to fragment. American hegemony, then, is a position
of special fragility.
America as the remaining empire has been left with the problems that the
older empires could not solve—creating nation-state stability in the critical
postcolonial zones. In places like Pakistan, the collapse of state institutions has
been exacerbated by urbanization, by the relentless growth of shantytowns that
collect unemployed or underemployed males who see the promise of globalized
prosperity on television in every cafe but cannot enjoy it themselves. In such
places the collapsing state fabric creates a vacuum. Who fills the vacuum? The
mullahs. They fill the vacuum not simply with indoctrination and cheap hatred
but by provision of real services. A poor parent in rural Pakistan near the north-
west frontier who wants a child to get an education sends him to a madraseh.
Parents with children they cannot look after send them to the mullah. However
uncomfortable it is to accept, terrorist movements are creating legitimacy in this
way, by providing services to fill the gap left by the absence of credible and com-
petent states.
The political Left uses “empire” as an epithet—imperial America, it declares,
can do anything, can shape the world chessboard any way it wants. The implica-
tion of the foregoing, however, is that America is not in a position to create sta-
bility on whatever terms it likes. The United States is the sole guarantor of order,
yet its capacity to control and determine outcomes is often quite limited, and
nowhere are the limitations of American power more evident than in the Middle
East. Since Franklin D. Roosevelt embraced the Saudis and Harry Truman recog-
nized Israel, American leadership has driven out the other potential arbiters, the
Russians and Europeans, without being able to impose its own terms for perma-
nent peace. Presidents have come and gone, but they have not been able to re-
solve this enduring hemorrhage of American national prestige.
For fifty years, the United States paid almost nothing for its support for Israel.
This was a debt of honor, a linkage between two democratic peoples. But three or
four years ago, it began to pay an ever higher strategic price for the continued Is-
raeli occupation of the Palestinian lands—an inability to broker a settlement
that would guarantee security for the Palestinian and Israeli peoples on the ba-
sis, essentially, of partition. American failure to impose such a settlement has
now brought national security costs; the events of 11 September 2001 cannot be
understood apart from that fatal dynamic. But it is a dynamic that indicates the
I G N A T I E F F 5 7
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limitations of U.S. power, even with close and devoted allies. American presi-
dents may well hesitate to put even more prestige on the line in this issue; if they
overreach in the Middle East, they may lose everything, while if they do not in-
vest enough, they may lose anyway. They are always managing the chief problem
of empire—balancing hubris and prudence. Today, in the face of a global chal-
lenge and the collapsing of distance, the decision “triage”—making the distinc-
tion between hubristic overreach and prudential caution—is much more
complicated. It is much more difficult to dismiss any nation—say, Afghani-
stan—as marginal, of no importance; any such nation is likely suddenly to be-
come a national security threat.
It is not just the Middle East that highlights simultaneously America’s awe-
some power and vulnerability. When American naval planners look south from
the Suez Canal, for instance, they see nothing good. Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti,
Eritrea, Yemen—all are dangerous places, and some of them have been fatal to
American service men and women. One of the traditional diplomatic and politi-
cal functions of the U.S. Navy is to represent and promote American imperial
power by showing presence, going ashore, showing the flag. But as the United
States has realized that forward
land bases for its other kinds of
combat power are more and more
vulnerable, the Navy’s role has be-
gun to shift to that of an offshore
weapons platform. Cutting back
military presence in places that
are too vulnerable to terrorist attack seems to be good news—after the USS Cole
attack, certainly. The cost, however, is that reducing base presence in these places
also reduces influence and potentially increases alienation. This is the
well-known downside to reducing exposure to terrorist attack. Americans come
to be regarded as a mysterious offshore presence, focused on weapons and disci-
pline, not on making friends, not on making alliances, not on making local
contact.
All this makes it apparent that the United States emerged from the Cold War
with very little idea of the strategic challenges that would face it afterward. It
won the Cold War by virtue of a strategic act of political-military discipline car-
ried out by administration after administration from 1947 to 1989. It was one of
the most sustained displays of political and military resolution in the history of
republics, and it brought triumphant success. But the nation’s post-1991 perfor-
mance looks much more like what used to be said of the British—the consolida-
tion of empire in a fit of absence of mind. Successive administrations—this
is not a political point—thought they could have imperial dominion on the
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cheap. They thought that they could rule a postcolonial, post-Soviet world with
the imperial architecture, military alliances, legal institutions, and international-
development organizations that Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had
created to defeat Hitler. As the world order arranged by Churchill and Roosevelt
comes apart, no new architectures, alliances, institutions, or organizations have
been established to replace the old. What has actually been put in their place is
American military power—and that is asking of it more than it can do. The
Greeks taught the Romans to call this failure hubris. But it is also a failure of his-
torical imagination—making the American military the preferred solution for
disorder that is replicating itself around the globe in overlapping zones and pos-
ing a security threat at home. It is an imperial problem that seems to be heading
for disaster.
A second fundamental imperial problem for the United States, on a par with
its structural vulnerability, is the fact that it is alone. Its neighbor Canada
spends 1.1 percent of its gross domestic policy on national defense, and its
armed forces are incapable even of defending the Canadian homeland. In Eu-
rope, large countries with long military traditions are investing in national de-
fense at levels of 2 percent, 2.2 percent, 2.3 percent of GDP; they are no longer
credible military allies. The military consequence is obvious in combined opera-
tions, but there is also a political aspect, an irony that has received too little at-
tention—that for Europe, spending so little on weapons is an enormous, historic
achievement. The Europeans spent so much on arms for 250 years that they nearly
destroyed their continent in two world wars. Today, they are trading down mili-
tary strength so sharply as to affect their very national identities; the European
states have become postmilitary cultures. In a sense, as Europe integrates into the
European Union, these states are even becoming “postnational” cultures.
This trend is producing a widening gap with the United States, not simply in
defense expenditure and military capability but in mentality. Europeans—whose
ancestors invented the very idea of martial patriotism, national conscription, and
national anthem—now look at American patriotism and think it an utterly alien
phenomenon. The United States, then, is the West’s last military nation-state. It can
no longer call on allies who fully understand the centrality of military power and
sacrifice in national identity. This isolation will be a long-term imperial chal-
lenge, because the decline of European defense budgets seems to be irreversible,
and a particularly difficult one, because America cannot do without Europe in
civilian terms. However contemptible its military capabilities become, Europe’s
social and economic reconstruction capacity is simply essential. The United
States must cooperate with these postnational, postmartial nation-states; with-
out them the American taxpayer will have to foot the entire bill for not only their
own defense but the maintenance of global order.
I G N A T I E F F 5 9
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Thus, on a specific issue of moment, it is possible that the most efficient solu-
tion to a postinvasion occupation of Iraq would be a U.S. military govern-
ment—a Douglas McArthur in Baghdad. Putting a qualified, tough American
general in charge of a military chain of command would be the most efficient,
and might be the cheapest, way to coordinate effort and resources. But the Euro-
peans would not have it. No Middle Eastern state would have it. The idea is sim-
ply not acceptable internationally; if it were pushed, no one would support the
reconstruction effort; the United States would bear the entire cost.
This instance points to a very different picture of the world than that enter-
tained by liberal international lawyers and human rights activists who hope to
see American power integrated into a transnational legal and economic order
organized around the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, the
World Trade Organization, and human rights treaties. Theirs is a feeble vision,
as we have seen; without American power, the multilateral international order is
a train without an engine.
There is a third imperial problem, or at least an inevitable part of a global war
on terror—nation building. Afghanistan has brought the point home. However
extraterritorial, nonterritorial, or nonnational a terrorist organization may be, it
needs facilities, especially to train its “foot soldiers.” Terrorists cannot sustain
themselves without compliant states who allow them to operate secretly or even,
as in this case, actually to run their foreign and domestic policies and fence off
large pieces of real estate. The United States sat and watched that happen in Af-
ghanistan for four years; that must never, ever, happen again. The United States
has learned that failed states can become direct national security risks and that
accordingly, like the idea or not, it is in the nation-building, or state-reconstruction,
business.
The exercise of nation building, however, raises a number of ethical diffi-
culties. In fact, there lies at the very heart of the matter a fundamental contra-
diction of principle and policy. The concept of human rights, which is the
semiofficial ideology of the Western world, sustains the principle of self-
determination—the right of each people to rule itself, free of outside interfer-
ence. It is a proposition dear to Americans, who fought a revolution to secure the
right to self-determination; it is the core of their democratic culture. How can
the imperial act of nation building be reconciled with it? The old imperial solu-
tion is collapsing; the problem falls ineluctably to the United States; nation
building is unavoidable. But how is it to be done? Bringing order is the paradig-
matic imperial task, but it is essential for reasons both of economy and principle
that it be done without denying local people their right to some degree of self-
determination.
6 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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The old imperialism, the nineteenth-century kind, justified itself as a mission
to civilize, to inculcate in tribes and “lesser breeds” the habits of self-discipline
necessary for the exercise of self-rule. This is not a minor point. We often think
that imperialism and self-determination are completely contradictory—
self-rule by strangers. Interestingly, however, all the nineteenth-century empires
used self-determination to main-
tain themselves. How? By making
a promise: “If you submit to us
now, we will train you to be free
tomorrow.” Self-determination and
imperialism, then, are not the polar
opposites they seem to be; as paradoxical as it may sound, self-determination is a
means by which to perpetuate imperial rule. Canada, for instance, was for a hun-
dred years a self-governing dominion within the British Empire. In the old im-
perialism, self-rule did not have to happen any time soon. The British kept their
hold on India for most of the twentieth century with assurances: “You are not
quite ready yet. Just be patient, and we will hand over to you.” The British man-
date in Palestine took the same tack.
The new imperialism works on a much shorter time span. The contradiction
between imperialism and democracy is much sharper in places like Afghanistan,
Kosovo, and Bosnia. The prospect of self-rule cannot be distant, because the lo-
cal elites are creations of modern nationalism, of which the primary ethical con-
tent is self-determination. In Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, and quite
probably in Iraq, the mantra is that local elites must be empowered to take over
as soon as imperial forces create conditions of stability and security. Nation
building thus seeks to reconcile imperial power and local self-determination
through the vehicle of an “exit strategy.” This is imperialism in a hurry to spend
money, get results, to turn over to the locals, and get out. But it is similar to the
old imperialism in the sense that the real power remains in imperial capitals. Lo-
cal leaders, even if elected by their own peoples, exercise limited power and must
always look over their shoulders to Washington. This new imperialism, then, is
humanitarian in theory but imperial in practice; it creates “subsovereignty,” in
which states possess independence in name but not in fact. The reason the
Americans are in Afghanistan, or the Balkans, after all, is to maintain imperial
order in zones essential to the interest of the United States. They are there to
maintain order against a barbarian threat.
Many people, particularly in the United States, feel that this is a terrible mis-
use of American combat power and resources. They consider it hubris that will
suck the nation into open-ended and unmanageable commitments. But are
there alternatives? There seems to be no other way in which to make the world
I G N A T I E F F 6 1
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safe for the United States. Exercises of imperial power are in themselves neither
illegitimate or immoral. For U.S. forces and resources to create (in Iraq, say) sta-
ble democratic institutions, establish the rule of law, and then leave would be
creditable—provided, of course, that the new democratic elite is not simply an
American puppet. The caveat would be especially critical in Iraq, and reconcil-
ing imperial power and democracy would become particularly delicate there.
We would have to create, or help to create, or help to repatriate a genuinely credi-
ble national leadership. The Iraqi National Congress, the Iraqi exiles in general,
are “not ready for prime time,” and there is no credible counter-elite in the coun-
try itself. The biggest challenge the United States would have in making Iraq
work is to find that elite and sustain it—and yet allow it the independence it
would need to achieve acceptance within the nation. It is not at all clear how that
can be done, but if the United States expels the Saddam Hussein regime, it will
have to be.
Does the United States have the right, in international law, to impose regime
change? I was a member of an international commission on intervention and
state sovereignty funded by the Canadian government and charged to report to
the UN Secretary General in September 2001. Our report set the ethical bar very
high. The commission argued that the only grounds for full-scale military inter-
vention in a state were human rights violations on the order of genocidal massa-
cre or massive ethnic cleansing. We believed that it is not a good idea for America
or any other country to knock over more or less at will sovereign regimes, even
odious ones. The United States would be, or feel, called upon to intervene every-
where, and whatever remains of the UN Charter system governing the use of
force in the postwar world would be destroyed. In that view—embarrassing as it
is for a human rights activist to say—intervention in Iraq is not justifiable on
strict human rights grounds. However, the combination of the regime’s human
rights behavior and its possession (actual or imminent) of weapons of mass de-
struction constitutes that ethical justification—provided that, as required by
just-war theory, the military instrument is the last resort. The exercise of secur-
ing Security Council legitimacy was a matter not of obtaining permission but of
establishing good faith, to document the crucial fact that the use of American
power was being contemplated only after a decade of attempts to disarm
Saddam Hussein by other means.
There is another ethical issue as well—under what obligation is the United
States to build a new Iraqi nation once it has knocked the door down? It is not
obvious in classical just-war theory that commencing hostilities obliges a nation
to clean up afterward. Whether such an obligation exists is a lacuna of just-war
theory. International law lists the things that legitimize the use of military force:
a nation is entitled to meet force with force; when a nation is attacked, it is
6 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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entitled to reply. But must it also rebuild, rehabilitate, reconstruct? What is the
ethical claim here? When the Allies had pulverized the regimes of Adolf Hitler
and the Japanese—as it was entirely right and proper for them to do, with the
totality of their military force—were they then under an obligation to rebuild
Germany and Japan? Many people, like Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Morgenthau, Jr., wanted them turned into pastureland, returned to abject agri-
cultural feudalism forever. The decision to reconstruct the two nations did not
emerge from the just-war tradition; it was made on prudential, political
grounds. Today, as in 1945, there is no strict, ethical obligation, but there is a
prudential, political one, if the United States wants to build stability, in its own
image. The intervention and state sovereignty commission tried to develop an
ethical system that made the right to intervene correlative with an obligation to
rebuild; that, we believed, is the way that the emerging, customary law of nations
should go. But the case to rebuild Iraq is fundamentally not ethical but pruden-
tial—it is a smart thing to do, a smart investment of American power.
Democracy is always thought of as the antithesis of empire, but one of the dra-
mas of American power in the twenty-first century is that empire has become a
precondition for democracy. Neither democracy nor anything like the rule of
law can be established in Afghanistan without a sustained, determined exercise
of American imperial power. There is no chance at all that Iraq will emerge from
forty years of authoritarianism to democracy and the rule of law without Ameri-
can imperial power. The United States was a democracy before it was an empire;
now, suddenly, it is involved in places where the historical relationship is re-
versed. The nation faces a challenge that will test its own legitimacy as a demo-
cratic society—not simply to create stability, to order matters to suit its national
interest, but to create institutions that represent the desire of local populations
to rule themselves. Can it use imperial power to strengthen respect for self-
determination, to give states back to the abused, oppressed people who deserve
to rule them for themselves?
I G N A T I E F F 6 3
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